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ABSTRACT
Resilience planning has emerged as a recently popularized phenomenon in the field
of urban planning, having the potential to reduce urban disaster risk while also enhancing
disaster recovery and preparedness. Current urban planning literatures fail to consider
resilience planning as a continuous process which integrates conditions of the pre- and
post-disaster landscape. Planners practice resilience through phases, organizing after a
disaster to plan and rebuild, largely ignoring the time before the disaster despite its
potential for ensuring long-term community resilience. In a context where disasters are
becoming more frequent, this time before needs to be considered when planning for
resilience. This study sits at the intersection of theory and praxis, attempting to reframe
resilience in the field of urban planning by analyzing how resilience is practiced on the
ground and at the community level.
This study argues that resilience planning needs to consider dynamics across
temporal space by studying the time between disasters. In New York City, this refers to the
near decade separating Hurricane Sandy and COVID-19. This framework is applied and
informed by a case study analysis in Rockaway, New York City, a community that has been
disproportionately impacted by both Hurricane Sandy and COVID-19. The methods in this
study include a series of qualitative semi-structured interviews with city agency
representatives and community organizers. Findings conclude that in Rockaway, the
practice and implementation of resilience planning within the last decade have contributed
to issues of distrust, trauma, and burnout, negatively impacting COVID-19 response and
recovery thus far. The continuous practice of resilience and recontextualization of
everyday risk can help reduce community distrust, trauma, and burnout that have emerged
as a result of the resilience planning cycle.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
Typically, [communities] muddle through, innovate, and learn as they go. But,
in the end, most agree that if they had known then what they have since
learned, their recovery could have been faster and easier.
- (Johnson and Olshansky, 2017, p. 3)
Resilience planning’s popularity contributing to schools of urban sustainability and
urban disaster risk reduction can be attributed to rapid urbanization and increased
susceptibility to disasters in cities at the global scale, specifically climate disasters (Norris
et. al, 2007, p. 136). Resilience planning in cities can be a powerful mechanism for reducing
a community's risk to disaster while also enhancing their ability to respond and recover. In
the wake of disaster “some kind of rebuilding will happen whether it is planned or not”,
providing planners with an opportunity to determine how this rebuilding will unfold (Finn
et al., 2019; Campanella, 2006). If resilience planning is successful in its implementation,
communities and planners alike will already have a sense of what this rebuilding will look
like. The post-disaster recovery period affords an opportunity to reassess established
resilience goals (knowing that rebuilding is going to happen) as well as examine the
justifications for doing so accounting for the immediate impacts of disaster (Finn et al, 2019,
p. 3). In New York City, Hurricane Sandy was the disaster that emphasized the need for a
citywide resilience agenda. Hurricane Sandy enabled an unprecedented amount of
resilience planning strategies in a short time period as communities attempted to, “rebuild
and recover from, as well as mitigate against, the effect of future (disaster) events” (Finn,
2016, p.117).
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The Rise of Resilience Planning in New York City
The result of a series of weather systems converging, Hurricane Sandy’s
tropical-storm force winds reached an alarming range of 1,000 miles一 roughly three times
greater than that of a regular Category 3 hurricane. The culmination of these winds, the
storm’s low pressure, and its direction, resulted in cataclysmic storm surges throughout
the region. Approximately 51 square miles flooded within New York City, accounting for
nearly 17% of the city’s total land mass. Within these 51 square miles lived 443,000 New
Yorkers, 88,700 buildings consisting of more than 300,000 homes, and 23,400 businesses.
These numbers neglect to include key city institutions such as hospitals, transportation
networks, wastewater treatment plants, and other facility types (The City of New York,
2013, p. 12). The New York metropolitan region was estimated to have more than $60 billion
in economic damages, designating Hurricane Sandy as the second costliest hurricane in the
history of the United States (Sanderson et al., 2016, p. 5). The greatest tragedy from
Hurricane Sandy was the death of 43 New Yorkers and 150 other persons unfortunately
located within its path (Shannon, 2014).
In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, planners, community organizers, and residents
alike mobilized in a way that had rarely been seen before. Around the city, organizers came
together to try and reframe the narrative of future recovery efforts. They implored that
“the tens of billions of dollars for redevelopment do not end up in the hands of the same
people that created these injustices” (Bondesson, 2017; Liboiron, 2013). The response by city
agency officials was arguably slow and faced many delays due to funding and logistical
challenges. In the meantime, community organizers had to find ways to mitigate the
immediate and detrimental impacts of disasters. Mutual aid networks, such as Occupy
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Sandy, emerged and began conducting their own resilience work on the ground giving
direct need to communities most affected by the storm. To understand the scale of these
efforts, Occupy Sandy had nearly 60,000 volunteers that provided direct aid including food,
water, medical, and legal assistance (Bondesson, 2017, p. 104).
When the city finally caught up despite initial delays on the ground, they were fairly
quick in delivering rebuilding and resiliency plans after the storm, drafting the Special
Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency (SIRR) report only a few weeks after the storm made
landfall (Finn et al., 2019, p.74). The report, originally written by the NYC Economic
Development Corporation (NYC EDC), was meant to expand on the city’s sustainability
plans laid out in Bloomberg’s 2007 PlaNYC framework by incorporating additional elements
of resilience planning. Since Sandy, other city agencies have taken the initiative to integrate
resiliency into their planning efforts. In March 2014, Mayor De Blasio founded the Office of
Recovery and Resiliency (MOR) and further formalized resiliency as a major goal of the city
through the release of One New York: The Plan for a Strong and Just City (Sanderson, 2016,
p. 21). In 2015, the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development
(HPD) began drafting the Resilient Edgemere Community Plan to address Sandy-related
damages in the Edgemere neighborhood of Rockaway, Queens. The plan is comprehensive
in its ability to address many aspects of the planning process, ranging from hazard
mitigation to economic development, coastal protections, infrastructure, and housing
(HPD, 2017). These plans will be analyzed for their effectiveness in ensuring long term
resiliency in more detail later on in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
Years after the storm, resilience planning efforts continue to be developed and
reframed within emerging contexts as disasters become more frequent. However, existing
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research neglects to assess and critique the plans that have been developed beyond their
theory and potentials, emphasizing the need for research that focuses on how these plans
have been implemented and practiced as they relate to both preparedness and recovery.
We are at a critical juncture in the planning process between disasters一 eight years after
Hurricane Sandy, New York City was once more struck by tragedy, one with a magnitude
unlike others seen before it: the COVID-19 pandemic. The first case of COVID-19 was
confirmed in New York City on March 1st, 2020, and nearly a month later, the city became
the center of the world's outbreak (Goldstein and McKinley, 2020). By acknowledging the
temporality of resilience, the time in between these two disasters can provide a framework
for what was successful and what was not successful when planning for resilience after
Hurricane Sandy.
By analyzing the effectiveness of past resilience planning strategies as they relate to
Hurricane Sandy recovery, there is potential to inform ongoing COVID-19 recovery plans as
well as future disaster-related planning efforts by determining which components of these
resilience planning strategies have helped mitigate the pandemic thus far. This study
conducts an in-depth examination of how resilience planning initiatives contribute to
disaster risk reduction, recovery, and preparedness, examining the approaches taken by
urban planners when establishing resilience planning strategies in the wake of disaster and
how communities use these tools to combat their unique physical, political, and
socioeconomic needs.
Research Purpose
This study analyzes the capacity of resilience planning strategies to support
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community preparedness and recovery in the face of large-scale and wide-impacting
disasters with the intention of reframing the ways in which resilience planning is theorized
and practiced. To better understand how communities navigate the complexities
surrounding the post-disaster recovery period, this thesis uses a case study approach
focusing on the Rockaway Peninsula, a community severely一and disproportionately一
impacted by Hurricane Sandy and COVID-19 (Rockaway Youth Task Force, 2020).
Did the resilience strategies that emerged post-Hurricane Sandy allow for
heightened community resilience and more successful community-level responses during
the COVID-19 crisis (prior to February 2021)? Did the varying trajectories and inequities in
planning efforts throughout the Rockaways determine a neighborhood's ability to combat
the COVID-19 pandemic? How did community organizations contribute to a
neighborhood’s preparedness in preparing for and recovering from disasters of such
magnitude? By answering these questions, this study hopes to inform policy makers,
community organizers, and urban planners alike of the capacity of resilience planning as a
tool to continuously and consistently enable both preparedness and recovery with respect
to disasters.
Roadmap
This first chapter provides a brief introduction to the issue at hand and emphasizes
the importance of the discussion to be had. The following literature review (Chapter 2)
frames the study in the field of urban planning through its exploration of existing literature
and schools of thought. This is done in an attempt to place this study within a greater
framework of urban and community resilience as they relate to disaster preparedness and
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recovery. Chapter 2 synthesizes existing literature while simultaneously identifying gaps in
available research, validating this study’s importance in the field.
Chapter 3 lays out the methodology of this study and justifies its use of exploratory
research methods. A mixed-methods approach will be used with a qualitative analysis
consisting of interviews with city agency representatives and community organizers that
will be framed within a case study. Chapter 3 will assess the resilience plans mentioned
above (SIRR and the Resilient Edgemere Community Plan). Chapter 4 offers an in-depth
analysis of the research findings which are based on the plans examined in Chapter 3. The
findings will be organized on the basis of themes or trends identified when executing the
aforementioned methodology.  These findings support the conclusions and implications
that are discussed within Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
First, this chapter outlines the evolution of resilience and positions the term within
the field of urban planning. To more clearly delineate the relevance of resilience in the case
study analysis of Rockaway, New York City, this literature review will emphasize how
resilience is practiced on the ground and in a community context. Lastly, this chapter will
describe community resilience as a means for disaster risk reduction, recovery, and
preparedness. This understanding of resilience under a planning framework will support
the findings of this research.
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What is Resilience?
With roots in physics and geology, the concept of resilience has transcended a
number of disciplines yet still remains ambiguous and without a standard definition.
Academics and practitioners alike have tried to tackle this ambiguity in an attempt to
better understand resilient systems in both urban and rural contexts. This has resulted in
an overwhelming number of discussions and debates surrounding resilience, consequently
perpetuating the ambiguity of the term and its reliance on both theory and practice.
Resilience research continues to face obstacles as “there is no consensus on the
referent of the term, standards for its application, or agreement on its role in explanation,
models, and theories” (Glantz and Slobada, 1999, p. 111). Holling (1973) is frequently cited as
the first to describe the phenomenon in the field of ecology. Holling drew the connection
between sustainability and resilience, defining resilience as the ability of a system to absorb
change while still maintaining the same relationships needed (Holling 1973, p. 7). As the
concept has evolved over time, Timmerman (1981) was notably the first to integrate
resilience beyond ecology and into natural hazards and disaster research, describing
resilience as the capacity of a system to absorb or recover from an event. More recent
definitions of resilience have shifted beyond resilience as a means for only absorbing
shocks by also incorporating elements of “adaptation, learning, and self-organization”
(Graham, 2016, p. 113). This growing understanding has evolved to reflect a system’s ability
to bring together elements of risk mitigation and adaptive capacity building while also
addressing issues of sustainability and social equity (Finn et al, 2019).
The continued politicization, fuzziness, and overuse of the term across disciplines
makes one question the purpose of resilience and whom it serves (Leach, 2008, p.3). As
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academics continue to debate the definition of the term, policymakers around the world
have created programs, plans, and strategies to guide cities and communities toward it. By
defining the term more clearly, resilience can be framed in such a way that “allows values to
be identified, choices to be made, and political pathways to be identified”, guiding policy
makers and planners in their decision making processes (Weichselgartner and Kelman,
2015, p. 256). This should be done to incorporate elements of adaptation, capacity building,
and social equity, emphasizing the natural flux of resilience that is necessary when using
resilience as a method for implementation. Despite attempts by practitioners to come to a
consensus on the term, resilience remains a buzzword in urban planning, diluting the
power that the concept holds as an effective planning tool.
Resilience Planning in Practice
Resilience is largely seen as a response to climate change where “building” resilience
is a guiding framework for climate adaptation work (Davoudi et al., 2012). These frameworks
neglect to consider the more holistic components of resilience and its ability to mitigate
disaster risk across multiple scales, time frames, and contexts. Planners operate at the
intersection of a variety of issues allowing them to address post disaster challenges in a
holistic manner and facilitate more informed recovery outcomes (Finn et al. pg 3. 2019).
Urban planners are at a critical point in the evolution of resilience theory where they have
the ability to more clearly conceptualize resilience in intellectual terms, as well as
determine the way resilience is implemented, practiced, and assessed.
Urban resilience, argues Campanella (2006), is the “capacity of a city to rebound
from destruction…[it is] largely a function of resilient and resourceful citizens” (p.141).
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Although important in its acknowledgement of resilient and resourceful citizens,
Campanella’s definition neglects to consider the elements of pre-disaster resiliency and a
community’s ability to prepare for and mitigate disaster risk. Currently, many uses of the
term separate recovery from preparedness when these elements need to be considered
simultaneously when planning for resilience. Cutter (2008) lends a more suitable definition
that accounts for both pre- and post-disaster conditions: “the ability of a social system to
respond and recover from disasters and include those inherent conditions that allow the
system to absorb impacts and cope with an event, as well as post-event, adaptive
processes” (p. 3). Although more useful than Campanella’s, this definition is limited in its
focus on social systems rather than urban systems as a whole. For the purpose of this
research, resilience will be defined in a way that is both complete and integrative:
Urban resilience refers to the ability of an urban system- and all its
constituent socio-ecological and socio-technical networks across temporal
and spatial scales-to maintain or rapidly return to desired functions in the
face of a disturbance, to adapt to change, and to quickly transform systems
that limit current or future adaptive capacity.
- (Meerow et al., 2016, p. 45)
Not only does this definition expand beyond social systems to incorporate entire
urban systems, but Meerow et al. (2016) highlight the dichotomy between a system
returning to its pre-disaster state while also having the ability to adapt beyond barriers
that limit future resiliency of that system. This counters the notion that resilient systems
must only return to their pre-disaster state rather than progressing into a more resilient
and adaptive state (Holling, 1979). Furthermore, this definition considers the urban system
in its entirety. This research incorporates the pre- and post-disaster state within the
greater urban system considering both preparedness and recovery under one framework,
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validating the use of Meerow et al.’s (2016) conceptualization. This conceptualization is
increasingly useful as it recognizes socio-ecological and socio-technical networks, which
will be useful for the case study analysis discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Elaborating on this
definition, resilience further considers conditions that allow a community to “absorb
impacts and cope with an event”, while simultaneously encompassing post-event processes
that allow communities to “re-organize, change, and learn” (Cutter et al., 2008, p.599).
At this point, it is apparent that there are semantic differences between key terms
related to resilience planning. In hopes of minimizing these semantic discussions, this
study will not delve into issues of vulnerability as it is often considered the “pre-event,
inherent characteristic or qualities of social systems that create potential for harm”,
whereas resilience is the ability of a system to respond and recover from disasters (Adger,
2006; Cutter, 1996). This consideration minimizes the capacity of resilience, constricting it
to antiquated frameworks and neglecting to acknowledge the system’s ability to absorb risk
and cope from an event, adapting to a more resilient state (Cutter et. al, 2008, p. 599).
Resilience is a dynamic process that depends on both the conditions of the pre- and
post-disaster state. Reframing resilience in urban planning to consider both recovery and
preparedness 一 rather than one or the other 一 is critical for the development of
successful resilience planning strategies. Too often, urban planners practice resilience in
distinct phases, organizing after the fact to rebuild and recover while later planning for
preparedness. This contradicts the ways in which communities practice resilience on the
ground as they face everyday hazards and risks continuously.
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Resilient Pathways on the Ground: Community Resilience
While many manifestations of resilience exist within and across urban planning
theory literatures, a community-based approach to resilience is perhaps the most
efficacious in practice. This study will focus on the local community level as this is where
resilient pathways exist “on the ground” (Adger et al., 2005). According to the United
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (2008), the resilience of a community
in respect to disaster risk is “determined by the degree to which the community has the
necessary resources available and is capable of organizing itself, both prior to and during
times of need” (p. 24). Community resilience, as described by Awotona, functions to directly
combat disaster risk where risk consists of four elements: hazard, exposure, vulnerability,
and consequence. How to manage these risks through risk reduction strategies becomes
the basis of building and achieving community resilience (Awotona, 2017, p. 1). Community
psychologist, Fran H. Norris (2007) argues that in order to build resilience “communities
must reduce risk and resource inequities, engage local people in mitigation, create
organizational linkages, boost and protect social supports, and plan for not having a plan”
(p. 136). Elaborating on Norris’ ideas, Awotona notes that community resilience must
account for a number of key adaptive capacities that ensure both preparedness and
recovery from disaster, including but not limited to, economic development, social capital,
information/communication, and community competence (Awotona, 2017, p. 11). By
increasing their resilience, communities can actively respond to and mitigate disaster risk
whether they are in the pre- or post-disaster period.
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Community Resilience as a Means for Disaster Risk Reduction, Recovery, &
Preparedness
As disasters become increasingly more frequent it is unsustainable that the
strengthening of community resilience be an afterthought only worked towards after
disaster strikes (Norris et. al, 2007, p. 136). Communities have many reasons for improving
their resilience continuously and beyond the post-disaster landscape. Increased resilience
results in stronger, safer, and more secure communities. It also provides a community with
a greater understanding of their inherent disaster risk, allowing for early risk identification,
adaptive capacity interventions, and the nurterment of a culture of self sufficiency, mutual
aid, and community networks (Awotona, 2017, p. 11). The importance of community
resilience has begun to gain traction even within the federal government: “preparedness
and resilience both depend on identifying and strengthening the people, processes, and
institutions that work well in a community under normal conditions, before an incident”
(Bach, 2010, p.8; FEMA, 2010). However, these conversations still have a propensity to
separate preparedness from resilience rather than consider them as concomitant
phenomena. By focusing on everyday risks, community resilience provides a framework for
local institutions, groups, and organizations to prepare for, and respond to, their unique
risks (Bach, 2015, p. 25).
Concentrating resilience efforts on the pre- and post-disaster landscape “threats,
hazards, and trauma” in daily life can be recontextualized to be reframed and reduced (Luft,
2009, p. 500). This notion poses challenges, however, as a lack of a clear end to community
resilience planning can be helpful in painting resilience as a cycle (which this study claims it
to be), yet hurtful as it also has the potential to retraumatize communities without any
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form of closure (Tornello, 2020, p. 21). With conditions of rolling crises, the time in between
disasters is integral in establishing key resilience planning goals, allowing communities to
develop, practice, and strengthen their resilience while lessening traumatic stressors that
are exacerbated immediately after a disaster.
The practice of resilience at the local community level is heavily dependent on a
community’s ability to self-organize (Graham, 2016). There is a misconception that
communities are homogeneous, always sharing similar goals and concerns. Rather,
communities can also be incredibly fragmented, divided by economic, social, and political
circumstances, resulting in greater hardships when maneuvering emergency management.
Prior to the development of resilience strategies, assessing the organization of a
community well before emergency events occur can help planners better understand a
community’s decision making process and identify opportunities for adaptive capacity and
support (Bach, 2015, p. 26).
Studies show that the operationalization of resilience and a community’s capacity to
enhance their resilience (through organizational means) are largely dependent on the
pre-existing conditions of the urban system (Grahman, 2016; Graham and Lang and
Hornburg, 1998). Because of this, this study uses a case study approach focusing on the
local community level within the Rockaway Peninsula of Queens, New York City. This study
will consider both the pre- and post-disaster conditions of the Rockaway urban system,
providing an in-depth analysis on how resilience is practiced on the ground and within a
particular context. By analyzing the ways in which the Rockaway community practices
resilience一as contrasted by the way planners operate within the resiliency framework一
resilience planning strategies can be assessed for their success with more clarity.
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Remembering that resilience is a dynamic process that spans across time and space,
Sharifi and Yamagata (2018) note that disaster risk management tends to focus on short-
and medium-term planning and suggest that the integration of resilience thinking can
encourage a transition to long-term planning (p. 6). Applying Sharifi and Yamagata’s
conceptualization of resilience, the longevity and ongoing condition of the COVID-19
pandemic creates a scenario ripe for the use of resilience planning strategies. Despite
dissimilarities in disaster type, COVID-19 and Hurricane Sandy share a commonality in
offering an opportunity to reflect on resilience planning and assessing where we have been
and where we need to go (Keenan, 2020). Resilience planning targets events that unfold
over time rather than those that occur abruptly, focusing on the temporal aspects of
disasters. By considering dynamics across temporal and studying the time between
disasters, resilience planning strategies can be reassessed. In New York City, this time
between refers to the near decade separating Hurricane Sandy and COVID-19. By focusing
on this “in-between” we are able to evaluate the successes and failures of resilience
planning strategies that were developed after Hurricane Sandy. This helps us begin to
understand how resilience planning strategies are helping (or hurting) communities
navigate COVID-19. These findings will allow urban planners to reconsider the ways in
which they develop resilience in the future, providing some sense of what is and what is not
effective in long term recovery and preparedness.
CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDY, METHODOLOGY, & BACKGROUND
Due to the lack of existing research on resilience planning strategies as they inform
the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the methodology of this study relies heavily on
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exploratory research methods. A mixed-methods approach is used, consisting of a
qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews with city agency representatives and
local community organizers as well as a case study analysis. This chapter focuses on
existing resilience planning strategies with the hope of providing context for the case study
and subsequent findings.
There are two goals of the qualitative interviews: first, to collect more information
on the execution of resilience strategies on the ground as opposed to in plan and second,
to garner public opinion on the effectiveness of these strategies as they relate to disaster
risk reduction, recovery, and preparedness when dealing with COVID-19. Interview subjects
were selected on the basis of both their professional and personal experiences with
resilience planning. A snowball sampling method was used to identify interview
participants. Semi-structured interview questions for both interview groups can be found
in the appendix of this thesis.
The findings from these interviews are contextualized within a case study
framework, focusing the scope of the research on the Rockaway peninsula. There is an
added focus on two paradoxical geographies within Rockaway一the western and eastern
ends of the peninsula. The neighborhoods on the western end are Breezy Point, Neponsit,
Belle Harbor, Seaside, and Rockaway Park, while the eastern end consists of Far Rockaway,
Arverne, Edgemere, Hammels, and Bayswater. The justification behind the use of Rockaway
as a case study for this research is both in part due to the socio-spatial fragmentation of
the Rockaways as well as the peninsula's inordinate and disproportionate devastation from
both Hurricane Sandy and COVID-19 (Rockaway Youth Task Force, 2020). Previous studies
further suggest that community resilience is heavily influenced by sense of community and
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attachment of place, to which Rockaway has an abundance (Binder, 2015; Henry, 2013; Kick
et al. 2011).
Case study analyses are appropriate when researching community resilience on the
ground. Case studies work well when studying complex events and phenomena, which in
this study refers to the recovery period following a disaster along with preparation for the
next (Graham, 2020).
An Introduction to Rockaway
Figure 1: Rockaway Peninsula Neighborhood Map
The Rockaway peninsula, often referred to as “The Rockaways” or more simply,
“Rockaway”, derives from a Native American word that translates to “sand place” (Kaplan
and Kaplan, 2003, pg. 1). Rockaway is home to a sequence of spatially linear coastal
neighborhoods on a narrow peninsula at the southernmost tip of Queens. The peninsula is
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connected to the north by the small neighborhood of Broad Channel and surrounded by
the Jamaica Bay estuary to the east and west. To the south, the peninsula abuts the Atlantic
Ocean forming 11 miles of continuous coastline. The Rockaways exist as a particularly
isolated series of neighborhoods, resembling a landscape more alike to that of the suburbs
than those of Manhattan (Graham, 2016; Small, 2017). See Figure 1 above for reference.
The history of Rockaway is atypical when compared to other New York City
neighborhoods. A resort destination for New Yorkers in the first half of the twentieth
century, Rockaway’s character transitioned as its recreational aspects faded away alongside
the emergence of a steadily increasing permanent population. At this time, the city was
experiencing a severe housing shortage stemming from the post-World War II migration of
southern Black and hispanic residents to northern cities. Inspired by the peninsula’s
isolation and vast amount of open space, city officials believed that Rockaway could be the
solution to the housing shortage. This was the city's way of relocating minority populations
outside of the center city, directing them to Rockaway without a choice (Kaplan and
Kaplan, 2003, p. 188).
Shipping problems off to a distant place was the equivalent of sweeping them
under the carpet. From the perspective of city officials, it did not matter that
the carpet grew bulky. The Rockaways became a convenient disposal outlet
for inconvenient individuals and families.
(Kaplan and Kaplan, 2003, p. 188)
Fast forward to today and Rockaway still shares a disproportionate amount of
unwanted institutional facilities with residents often referring to the peninsula as a
“dumping ground” for the city (Interview Participant 4, 2021). Rockaway has six public
housing developments, all of which are located on the eastern end of the peninsula which
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continues to struggle as a result of its complex development history. There is also a large
number of nursing homes located on the eastern end, contributing to the chronic
vulnerability of the population (DuBois, 2016). Within the Far Rockaway, Bayswater,
Edgemere zip code, 21% of residents live below the poverty line with an average household
income of $46,000 annually. Breezy Point, on the eastern end, has a median household
income of $103,000 annually (Goldenberg and Bocanegra, 2020). Breezy Point is majority
white with 77.8% of residents identifying as white and 5.8% identifying as Black. In Far
Rockaway, 42.3% of residents identify as Black (United States Census Bureau, 2020). The
unique challenges confronting the eastern end are obscured by the western end’s
overwhelmingly wealthy, white, homeowner population that is overrepresented in local
government and recovery politics (Graham, 2016).
Rockaway has suffered as a result of its geographic isolation and years of neglect
from the city, albeit this suffering remains worse for residents on the eastern end than it
does for those on the western end. These tensions were exacerbated after Sandy as a sense
of abandonment grew amongst residents regarding recovery efforts (Graham, 2016).
Although the research and purpose of this thesis is not inherently political, it would be
naive to ignore the political landscape (and its discrepancies) between the western and
eastern ends. The disproportionate power of the western end as manifested in local
political representation is embedded in racial disparities, classism, and immense political
sway rooted in race based privilege.
Historical conditions on the peninsula and their stark spatial divisions have laid the
framework for immense disaster risk in Rockaway, whether it be with respect to a natural
storm or a public health crisis. The history of development in Rockaway is extensive and
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regrettably problematic from an urban planning standpoint making it noteworthy to
consider when planning on the peninsula. Given the context of this research, this thesis is
limited in its scope and will refrain from any historical discussions on which there is ample
existing research available.
Hurricane Sandy in Rockaway
Located in a low-lying flood zone, when Hurricane Sandy struck in October 2012,
the Rockaway peninsula experienced storm surges greater than nine feet (Graham, 2020).
Five to six feet of flood water submerged the peninsula, resulting in wide-spread power
outages affecting 120,000 residents (Storr et. al, 2017). At the time, there were only 128,400
total residents living on the peninsula (OSC, 2018, p. 2). These power outages lasted longer
than anywhere else in the city. Fires destroyed more than 130 homes across the peninsula,
the infamous boardwalk revered for its summer memories was washed away, and more
than one million cubic yards of sand from the shoreline were erased (Graham, 2016).
The ocean met the bay that day, inundating the peninsula with heaps of flood water.
The storm undoubtedly impacted the lives of every resident on the peninsula, although
specific impacts varied based on the neighborhood they were living in and their
socioeconomic status. The western end of the peninsula was more vulnerable to flooding
given its close proximity to sea level, resulting in a higher destruction of homes (DuBois,
2017). Not to mention, the western end has a higher percentage of homeowners who had to
deal with issues of FEMA flood insurance policies and reconstruction (Khalamayzer, 2013).
Issues on the eastern end were not as visible and apparent as physical destruction.
Although residents on the eastern end also struggled to restore their residences following
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the storm, they also struggled to find food and gain access to basic resources (DuBois,
2016). Sandy did not discriminate in its impacts一a weather event with no set agenda or
compass一but the preexisting historic and political fabrics of Rockaway paved the way for
disproportionate damages to take hold. The peninsula still struggles to this day to alleviate
the impacts of the storm and the underlying conditions it exposed, ensuring that all future
disasters in Rockaway will not be met without immense challenges.
Figure 2: Hurricane Sandy Inundation Area
Special Initiatives for Rebuilding & Resilience
Resilience planning strategies were quick to emerge following Hurricane Sandy. Just
weeks after the storm hit, the New York City Economic Development Corporation (NYC
EDC) began drafting the Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency (SIRR) report,
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expanding on the city’s existing sustainability frameworks laid out in the Bloomberg
administration's 2007 PlaNYC policy report (Finn et al., 2019). The SIRR report was used as a
means for integrating resiliency into citywide planning efforts, which prior to Hurricane
Sandy, was largely unheard of. After three years of planning efforts, the SIRR report was
released with a whopping 257 action items that collectively totaled $20 billion in
investments. The implementation of the plan originally fell under the purview of the
Mayor’s Office of Long Term Planning and Sustainability (OLTPS) but in 2014, after the
creation of the Office of Recovery and Resilience (MOR) under Mayor De Blasio’s
administration, the report was delegated to the new office (Finn, 2019, p.8). The
establishment of MOR further formalized resilience as a major goal of the city with the SIRR
report being their first major undertaking. The SIRR report is also to this day one of the
only resilience plans published by the city that actually defines the term: “1. Able to bounce
back after change or adversity. 2. Capable of preparing for, responding to, and recovering
from difficult conditions” (City of New York, 2013, p. 3). Although limited by its simplicity,
the definition provides some guiding principles for the plan that is not seen consistently
throughout the city’s resilience planning strategies.
Building on past sustainability plans, the SIRR report includes updated climate
projects describing the city’s vulnerability to sea-level rises and future climate disasters.
Conducted during active recovery, the six-month planning process for the report engaged
with stakeholders and the public, narrowing its focus on neighborhoods hit worst by the
storm. Within these neighborhoods, 320 community-based organizations and businesses
participated in the SIRR planning process (Bondesson, 2017, p. 125).  The process was
intended to engage stakeholders and residents in long-term planning efforts while the
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storm’s impacts were still fresh. Although seemingly well intended, there is a propensity for
practitioners of emergency management and urban planning to glamorize the
post-disaster climate, resembling sharks swooping in for their prey. This was seen with the
rapid adoption of the SIRR report. Although it is important to engage in disaster recovery
immediately and to act quickly, there needs to be a greater acknowledgment of the trauma
experienced by disaster survivors as well as active tools to respond to this trauma.
Within the report itself, there are strategies that focus on infrastructure, built
environment, and adaptive systems such as coastal protections, retrofits, and more (City of
New York, 2013). Five geographic areas were identified as being hard hit by Sandy and were
given their own plans that provided a greater level of detail for recovery and resilience
strategies (Finn, 2016, p. 125). One of these areas was of course, southern Queens and the
Rockaway peninsula. Chapter 16 of the report focuses on the conditions of the Rockaway
peninsula and provides resilience planning strategies that are specific to the region.
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Figure 3: South Queens, SIRR Report (The City of New York, 2013)
Categorized as South Queens, the report defines the SIRR Area (seen in Figure 3) as
“neighborhoods [that] share a common geomorphology” (City of New York, 2013, p. 303).
This categorization neglects to consider any of the unique social, political, and economic
conditions on the peninsula and instead lessens it to a mere physical description. This
de-emphasis of community conditions is a tendency seen throughout a majority of the
city’s larger more comprehensive resilience strategies. Although there is a brief mention of
the peninsula’s spatially manifested socioeconomic discrepancies, it is glossed over with a
greater focus placed on building typologies and infrastructure investments. Arguments can
be made for a decentralized approach to recovery as opposed to comprehensive plans to
avoid this issue (Saleena et al., 2017). Community-level planning will be discussed in more
detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
Chapter 16 of the SIRR report provides an overview of damages from the storm and
proposes relevant infrastructure improvements. To name only a few, these infrastructure
plans include hardening utility sources against hard winds and flooding as well as hospital,
nursing home, and public housing retrofitting. A large number of tasks were delegated to
the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), including site analyses and coastal
storm protection infrastructure projects. Aside from infrastructure improvements, the
report also includes community recovery and economic development tasks. The majority of
these interventions were related to local businesses, focusing on the revitalization of
central business districts. When comparing these interventions to the infrastructure
strategies, they are less developed and consist mostly of further planning efforts or
competitions such as the Neighborhood Game Changer competition (City of New York,
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2013, p. 318). Unfortunately, many of these programs and competitions never took hold.
Narrowing in on community resilience strategies, Chapter 16 transitions to a
subchapter written under the headline of “Initiatives for Increasing Resiliency in South
Queens”. Within this section there are multiple resilience goals described which consist of
interventions related to: Coastal Protection, Buildings, Insurance, Critical Infrastructure,
Liquid Fuels, Healthcare, Telecommunications, Transportation, Parks, Water and
Wastewater, Critical Networks, Community and Economic Recovery, Environmental
Protection, and Solid Waste. For simplicity's sake, some of these interventions can be found
in Table 1. However, this is not meant to be an exhaustive list but rather an example of the
goals in place and their related initiatives.
TABLE 1
The SIRR Report: Initiatives for Increasing Resilience in South Queens:
Resilience Goal Initiative
Coastal Protection
1. Call on and work with the USACE to
complete emergency beach nourishment on
the Rockaway Peninsula
2. Raise bulkheads in low-lying neighborhoods
to minimize inland tidal flooding
3. Complete short-term dune improvements
on the Rockaway Peninsula
4. Call on and work with the USACE to
complete existing studies of the Rockaway
Peninsula and implement coastal protection
projects
Community & Economic Recovery
1. Identify and address gaps in community
capacity
2. Continue and expand OEM’s Community
Emergency Response Teams
3. Launch business recovery and resiliency
programs
4. Launch neighborhood retail recovery
program
5. Continue to support FRESH program to




1. Require the retrofitting of existing hospitals
in floodplains
2. Require retrofitting of nursing homes in
floodplains
3. Increase the air conditioning capacity of
nursing homes and adult care facilities
4. Harden primary care and mental health
clinics
5. Improve pharmacies’ power resilience
6. Encourage telecommunications resiliency in
the healthcare system
Transportation
1. Elevate traffic signals and provide backup
electrical power
2. Plan for temporary transit services in the
event of subway system suspensions
3. Identity critical transportation network
elements and improve transportation
responses to major events through regular
resiliency planning exercises
4. Expand ferry service to Rockaway Peninsula
5. Expand the city’s Select Bus Service (SBS)
network
Source: SIRR Report (The City of New York, 2013)
It is worth noting that not all of these plans were aimed at the Rockaways in
particular, despite being written into the South Queens chapter. For example, under the
community and economic recovery goals, initiative one refers to a pilot assessment
program run by the NYC Office of Emergency Management (NYC OEM) and New York City
Center for Economic Opportunity (CEO). This pilot program would conduct an assessment
of a Sandy-impact community which could be South Queens, but could also be a number of
other neighborhoods (City of New York, 2013, p. 331). Faults of this capacity can be
attributed to comprehensive planning strategies. When planning for the city as a whole as
opposed to specific neighborhoods, generalizations are abundant.
One could argue that the SIRR report is a prime example of how urban planners
mobilize in the wake of disaster by using tragedy as a means to redevelop and move
forward with built environment specific development strategies and programs. Wildfire, a
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mutual aid and advocacy organization that emerged after Sandy in Rockaway, made one of
their first action movements a disruption of a SIRR workshop. Unimpressed by the city’s
planning efforts, Wildfire believed the SIRR process was placating community voices as a
means for promoting their own urban planning agenda, that in their belief, was planned
prior to Sandy (Bondesson, 2017, p. 126). Wildfire disrupted the SIRR workshop by speaking
out among participants and criticizing the way the city was handling the post-disaster
recovery process. This example is one of many that highlight the discrepancies between
how resilience is practiced by urban planners as opposed to community organizers and
those actively experiencing everyday hazards and risks.
The SIRR report is one of the most comprehensive resilience plans undertaken by
the city. Despite its limitations, its efforts should not be undervalued. However, many plans
that seem exceptional when written fail to deliver and so it is worth exploring just how
effective the SIRR report has been and how many of these initiatives went beyond plan and
into practice. The effectiveness of the SIRR report will be explored in more detail within the
findings chapter of this thesis.
The Resilient Edgemere Community Plan
Moving forward a few years, resilience planning strategies were still in full swing as
the damages from Sandy were long lasting. In 2015, the New York City Department of
Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) began drafting the Resilient Edgemere
Community Plan to address Sandy-related damages in the Edgemere neighborhood.
Edgemere is a neighborhood located on the eastern end of the peninsula that is riddled
with vacant land, enabled by a long history of disinvestment by the city. Edgemere is
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further disadvantaged by its low-lying waterfront location (Finn et al. 2019). In addition to
large amounts of vacant land (much of which is publicly owned), a large Urban Renewal
Area designation under the jurisdiction of HPD is located within the neighborhood (HPD,
2017).
The Resilient Edgemere Community Plan is particular in its ability to address many
aspects of the planning process, ranging from hazard mitigation to economic development,
infrastructure, social equity, and housing (HPD, 2017). According to the former director of
resilience planning at HPD, Deborah Morris, “It is the city’s first neighborhood plan that
looks comprehensively at housing, transportation, community resources, and harnessing
our disaster recovery tools” (Kensinger, 2017). Contained in the plan are 60 concrete
projects, clearly defined goals, strategies, and millions of dollars in investment targeted for
the 10 years following the plan and beyond (HPD, 2017). Similar to the SIRR report, the
planning process included public workshops and stakeholder meetings, although for the
Resilient Edgemere Community plan this was an 18-month process (as opposed to a
6-month process). The plan was finalized and released in early 2017 and its implementation
is ongoing.
Key components of the plan include the construction of 41 attached and elevated
homes totalling 107 units, 51 of which will be affordable. A $14 million raised shoreline will
be constructed with a berm elevating Edgemere against 30 inches of sea level rise. The plan
also includes proposals for $68 million in improvements to Beach 41st St. Houses and Beach
41st. St Cornerstone Community Center, two facilities managed by the New York City
Housing Authority (NYCHA). With respect to land use, 5 acres of city owned lots will be
converted into mixed use development consisting of retail, community facility, and
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affordable housing typologies. Another 16 acres of land, respectively in low-lying coastal
areas, will be used for open space that provides an additional coastal protection (HPD,
2017). Further initiatives in the plan will be listed in Table 2. Once more, this is not an
exhaustive or comprehensive list. It does not describe the initiatives in much detail
however, they can be found within the report itself.
TABLE 2
The Resilient Edgemere Community Plan:
Resilience Goal Initiative
Protect the Neighborhood from
Flooding
1. Strengthen the Coastal Edge
2. Adapt to Increased Flood Risk
3. Create Waterfront Connections
4. Improve Drainage and Water Quality
Create Resilient Housing and Maintain
Low Density Feel
1. Strengthen Resiliency of Existing Homes
2. Limit New Residential Development in
Vulnerable Areas
3. Fill in the Gaps (Facilitate the development
of new homes for moderate- and
middle-income homebuyers on vacant infill
properties in areas less susceptible to
flooding to maintain neighborhood
character)
4. Focus Development Near Transit and
Resources
Improve Streets and Transportation 1. Improve Pedestrian and Bicycle Access
2. Improve Transit Service and Reliability
3. Improve Regional Access
Increase Neighborhood Amenities
1. Expand Access to Quality Retail
2. Improve Existing Facilities and Services
3. Connect Jobseekers to Resources and
Trainings
4. Create a Healthier Neighborhood
5. Improve Communications between New
York City Officials and Residents
Source: Resilient Edgemere Community Plan, (HPD, 2017)
Edgemere is a community where there is an opportunity to plan for disaster
recovery and preparedness in the long-term context, due in part because of damages
31
incurred from Sandy but also the neighborhood’s history of disinvestment and neglect
(Kensinger, 2017). The Resilient Edgemere Community plan provides a semblance of hope in
redefining the way practitioners approach resiliency, emphasizing the need for community
based resilience and initiatives that support both preparedness and recovery. However, it is
still a bit early to determine how successful the plan has been as it is still in its initial stages
of implementation.
HPD recently released a 2020 progress report that marks milestones achieved thus
far in the planning process. The implementation and outreach stage has been completed
and next steps will advance the plan’s land use framework and more recent Community
Land Trust initiatives. As of January 2021, the environmental review process is underway
for the area-wide rezoning. While the environmental review process is underway, the rest
of Winter 2021 will be dedicated to accepting RFP/RFQs for the community land trust.
Public review for the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP) will begin in Summer
2021 and be reviewed by the Department of City Planning (DCP), the local community board
(Queens CB14), the Queens Borough President, City Council, and the Mayor’s office (HPD,
2017).
This thesis can go on and on describing the immense amount of planning work that
has been done since Hurricane Sandy, but instead chooses to be selective in discussing
these two larger, more prominent plans and how they set the tone for resilience planning
strategies in the city of New York. Figure 4 below summarizes other planning strategies
that emerged after Sandy to emphasize the wealth of planning that occurred in Rockaway
after the storm.
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Figure 4: Resilience Planning in Rockaway throughout the Years
The Impacts of COVID-19 in Rockaway
In the midst of these ongoing planning processes, New York City was met with a
disaster of unmatched proportions with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Once more
Rockaway’s fragility was exposed, resulting in calamitous impacts from the pandemic. As
history has a tendency to repeat itself, these impacts were felt more on the eastern end of
the peninsula where a high majority of frontline healthcare workers live. Healthcare is the
largest employer in the Rockaways, accounting for 5,900 jobs and 39% of all private sector
jobs. More than 75% of these jobs are held by residents living in Far Rockaway and
Edgemere. In Arverne and Seaside, two-thirds of jobs are in the health care or
transportation sectors (OSC, 2018). The immense number of front line workers living in
Rockaway一particularly on the eastern end一contributes to the community’s vulnerability
and risk profile.
By the end of May 2020, 443 residents within the Far Rockaway, Bayswater, and
Edgemere neighborhoods died from COVID-19, 129 of which were living in nursing homes.
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As previously mentioned, a large number of nursing homes are located on the eastern end,
where COVID’s impacts were notoriously more prominent (Rockaway Youth Task Force,
2020). Contrastingly, tucked away on the eastern end, Breezy Point suffered only 2 deaths
within the same time period (McGowan, 2020). The peninsula is underserved in terms of its
access to healthcare facilities and services, with only one hospital on the peninsula serving
120,000 residents. The hospital is supported by less than adequate public transportation
options, ensuring that access to care remains a barrier for residents who are already
inconvenienced by the longest commute times in the city. With average commute times of
53-minutes or more, getting care in other city neighborhoods is not feasible (Hybenova,
2016). Residents in neighborhoods on the eastern end are more reliant on public
transportation, with a public transportation usage rate of 37.7% as opposed to 23.9% on the
western end (United States Census Bureau, 2021). These factors, alongside the
aforementioned risks, compounded to make Rockaway one of the hardest hit communities
during the pandemic (Rockaway Youth Task Force, 2020).
Although the hurricane happened nearly 9 years ago, this past year community
organizers and urban planners alike have been drawing on the lessons learned during the
storm as a blueprint in navigating and initiating recovery efforts for the pandemic (Rendon,
2020). The next chapter of this thesis will present findings from qualitative interviews that
speak more directly to the lessons learned from Sandy and how they have informed
community organizers and urban planners in their response and recovery processes in
recent months.
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS & DISCUSSION
Chronicling disaster recovery is a demanding process due to the natural chaos of
recovery (Graham, 2007) and it has the capacity to unearth traumatic memories for those
involved, particularly with respect to the community populations that lived through
disaster. The findings presented in this chapter attest to this while also highlighting the
influence of the peninsula’s historical fragmentation as a result of continued
socioeconomic, political, and spatial conditions. Navigating semi-structured interviews
related to disaster planning requires considerable attention to aspects of care, humility,
and empathy. Because of the sensitive nature of these topics, all interview participants will
remain anonymous.
Interviews were conducted with nine practitioners who specialize in resilience
planning and/or community organizing in the city of New York and Rockaway. Interview
participants were selected from key city agencies that focus their efforts on issues of
housing, development, resilience, emergency management, and other related disciplines.
Throughout these interviews, commonalities were found that formed the basis of themes
for resilience planning in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy and how these plans have
informed recovery efforts in the ongoing COVID-19 crisis. The findings of this study are
presented and organized based on these identifiable trends. Although not all participants
shared similar sentiments these themes were imperative to the research evidenced by their
frequent mention throughout the interview process.
Trends have been categorized into three distinct groups: distrust, trauma, and
burnout. Integrating these concepts into earlier discussions of resilience as it exists across
temporal space, these themes can be understood in relation to the different and distinct
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phases of resilience planning used by practitioners: disaster response (distrust), recovery
(trauma) and preparedness (burnout). These phases are often seen as distinctly different
from each other through planning activities, however, the findings in this section illustrate
just how interconnected they really are.
Distrust & Disaster Response
I clearly remember standing in front of our building days after Sandy, and
waiting and waiting and waiting... you know, for weeks...Yeah. And saying to
somebody, when... when is help going to come? When's the American Red
Cross gonna come? When is the city gonna help? And this person looked at
me and laughed, and said, ‘That's ridiculous. They're not coming’. And you
know what, it was true.
-(Interview Participant 4, 2021)
Days after Hurricane Sandy, there was an overwhelming sense of abandonment felt
by residents as they quickly realized that they would be responsible for their own recovery
efforts. The day immediately following the natural disaster was a different type of beast and
neighbors had to adapt to become first lines of defense: they were the ones that held the
shovels during clean up, the ones who gave out food, and the ones who provided the most
immediate direct aid. Volunteers organized quickly to make up for the lack of immediate
government assistance. Mayor Bloomberg had not yet requested support from FEMA or
asked the governor to declare a state of emergency, despite the storm's anticipation the
week prior. As described by one interview participant, there was no way that FEMA could
be there because they were not asked to be.
Feelings of abandonment were nothing new for residents of the peninsula, as
distrust towards different levels of government has been rampant throughout the
community for many decades. As one community organizer recalled their sentiment back
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in 2007, they were “disgusted and angry at the city that pretty much abandoned and
overlooked all of the issues and all the problems going on in the Rockaways.” This disgust
became the motivation for beginning their nonprofit organization and taking ownership
over the issues plaguing the peninsula.
This distrust is not limited toward the city, however, as it exists on many levels of
government. This distrust is rooted in the historic foundation of the peninsula and is
embodied across all aspects of life for Rockaway residents. It comes from police, it comes
from nature (extreme weather events), it comes from individual perceptions of public
officials regarding what is and what is not promised to them. When a community is so
blatantly disregarded and undervalued for years, this distrust is unavoidable and it
continues to provide immeasurable complications for the disaster recovery process.
As resilience planning strategies began to unfold in the Rockaways after Hurricane
Sandy, issues of distrust were not resolved but instead exacerbated. This was due in part
from the general lack of implementation of these plans and what the community refers to
as “lip service” or keeping “plans on the shelf.” Many community members were quick to
discount the plans created by government agencies due to their lack of trust and belief that
there were ulterior motives behind planning processes. Regarding the aforementioned
Resilient Edgemere Community plan, one community organizer described the intention
behind the plan as:
Giving [HPD] reason and rationale to go in and build more housing in one of
the lowest and most densely populated areas of New York City. It’s
reinforcing why they can go ahead and do that and we don't agree with
it...building more housing in a floodplain for low income residents is crazy.
It’s absolutely crazy. And the city’s going to do it. Why? Because they said it’s
going to happen one way or the other, because somebody is going to build on
it.
-(Interview Participant 4, 2021)
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Conversations with city agency employees who specialize in housing contradict
these assumptions. Instead, attributing the rise of the plan to the availability of HPD’s
vacant land, housing financing tools, and a rise in storm recovery funding opportunities.
One participant stated that this was a rare instance in which resources were made available
to bring a housing plan down to the community context: “We were gonna have meetings,
we were gonna produce a plan, we have a lot of resources to play with, sometimes you do
not.” Through the planning process for the Resilient Edgemere Community plan,
community participation allowed for a more holistic approach to resiliency that
incorporated longstanding goals rather than just infrastructure investments. However, this
was not enough to convince the community that the plan would be successful. Even with
available funding for the proposal, residents are still skeptical, stating that available funding
is still no guarantee that the plans will be implemented but instead it might just mean that
there will be another planning process and a subsequent “plan on the shelf.” Because the
Resilient Edgemere Community plan is currently in the environmental review process, it is
hard for the community and city to speak any further on the plan. That being said, the
apparent distrust and fear felt by the community toward the plan speaks volumes on the
long-lasting impacts of resilience planning in Rockaway.
Still on the topic of implementation, as mentioned in the Chapter 3, many initiatives
contained in the SIRR report have not been implemented despite the extensive planning
processes undergone when creating the report. Some community members and city
agency representatives alike would attribute this to administrative shifts as the Bloomberg
and De Blasio administrations transition shortly after the storm in 2013. Under Bloomberg’s
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PlaNYC policy initiative (the earlier framework for the SIRR report), teams of people went
to Rockaway to help with public engagement regarding a park development that was led by
a local nonprofit. Professional planners and designers were hired and the park was realized,
ultimately becoming one of the few infrastructures not damaged during Sandy that
effectively mitigated flood water. Sentiment towards Bloomberg is a bit more favorable
than it is to De Blasio, according to two participants.
Aside from earlier PlaNYC programming, there has been a lack of clarity in the
community with questions about what the city has done and how it will help residents in
the event of another disaster. For example, USACE is currently working on a number of
projects in Rockaway, however, they do not have any formal community engagement
processes, leaving the community entirely in the dark regarding what is happening in their
own backyard. Somehow, the community has to trust that USACE is working on
improvements that will really protect them however, when looking around the country,
“that’s not the case. Right? That’s not the case in New Orleans, certainly not the case in
Miami. And it’s definitely not the case in Rockaway.” There is a real concern and fear from
community members that if another hurricane like Sandy were to happen tomorrow, there
is still no clear guidance on what would happen or understanding of how these plans will be
able to prevent the same immense damages from taking hold again.
Another point of contention for Rockaway residents that stems from the SIRR report
is the noticeable gap in infrastructure investments on the peninsula’s ocean side as
opposed to it’s bay side. In addition to the racial disparities seen between the east and west
end of the peninsula, a somewhat linear, spatially manifested (yet imperfect), racial divide
exists between the Atlantic side and the Jamaica Bay side. Historically, this can be
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attributed to the proclivity of oceanfront properties to be reserved for white families.
Within the SIRR report there are rebuilding initiatives that describe flood-protection
improvements and infrastructure investments for both the sides of the peninsula, however,
in 2017 the $341 million boardwalk made its debut on the Atlantic side, yet the Jamaica Bay
side still remains left unprotected and vulnerable despite countless promises by officials
throughout the last decade for additional improvements. This discrepancy has little to do
with risk as surge flooding poses an equal risk between both the Atlantic side and Jamaica
Bay (Erdos, 2018).
Although the lack of implementation and transparency has exacerbated the
community’s distrust towards levels of government, there have been silver linings to come
out of the city-led planning processes. A growing feeling among nonprofit organizers
supports the idea that city government employees value and understand the importance of
local-based knowledge. A more effective feedback loop has been established between local
representatives and city government:
They [city government] really appreciated and acknowledged more of the
feedback from locally based nonprofits so I think they believed us when we
said, ‘we have no power, we have no gas, we have no lights, we need help’, and
they listened
-(Interview Participant 4, 2021)
This has coincided with feelings of greater respect from the city for locally based
organizations, a direct result of the planning processes outreach methods which really
ached for nonprofit inputs, “to the point that they would pay [nonprofits].”
Trauma & Disaster Recovery
[Planners] were sharing presentation photos and a couple people said, ‘You
know, I really suffer from trauma from seeing those images...it triggers a
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whole other host of you know, things I am scared of… I don’t even know that I
want to be a part of this planning thing, because I don’t want to be scared
again that this isn’t going away’. And so then, you throw that on top of COVID
and isolation and it’s...it’s even harder, right?
-(Interview Participant 4, 2021)
There are extreme difficulties that arise when planning after tragedy that coincide
with the desire of community residents to know that there is a plan for their recovery. This
is aggravated by “the inevitable conflict that occurs between the overwhelming goal of
citizens to return to conditions that existed prior...the desire to reconstruct...and the hard
reality that recovery is inevitably less than the potential that exists for dramatic change”
(Olshansky and Johnson., 2014). When a community is still struggling to trust those who are
delivering the plans for recovery, there is the potential for disaster related trauma to
amplify in the weeks, months, and years following an event. This is compounded by the
everyday risk community members face, intensified by their pre-existing system and its
conditions.
Creating plans in response to disaster is a tedious and time-consuming process that
requires a lot of effort from community members and urban planners alike. The planning
process traditionally engages communities around a project or a proposal, some sort of
change that is happening in the community. Proposals that imply drastic change presented
to communities shortly after a disaster can trigger a whole host of emotions. These
emotions can worsen depending on how these presentations unfold. For example, some
community members in Rockaway are so frightened of seeing photos from Hurricane
Sandy that they refuse to participate in the planning process at all. These presentations
triggered already existing traumatic stressors in the community that were largely ignored
by planners. After Sandy, a survey of 540 households in Rockaway was conducted by
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Subaiya et al (2018), concluding that 51.8% of households experienced anxiety, 36.9% had
sleep problems, 28.9% had significant emotional concerns, and 15.7% had nightmares
related to the storm (Subaiya et al., 2018). Planners are able to disassociate with these
traumatic stressors a bit more, given that in their minds, they are simply doing their job.
Whereas for communities that lived through these events, these stressors are embedded
and unwavering in their everyday experiences.
One interview participant who focused on housing suggested that the moment to
make determinations of public policy is not in the aftermath of a disaster when residents
are actively undergoing trauma, asserting that this was an unreasonable ask. Sharing a
similar sentiment, another government agency representative introduced a concept she
coined as “ridiculous resilience”一something she heard mentioned by another emergency
management professional. The idea, generally, was that oftentimes it is default for
practitioners to say that “communities are tough, or they’re hardy” when describing the
planning process. Although that may be true, the interview participant continued, “we
should not be in a place where we’re always asking communities to be extra tough or to
have grit. There’s a foundation of what government institutions can provide people.” The
discussion continued to elaborate on how there is often an unfair burden placed on
communities to be in charge of their own resilience, however, it becomes increasingly
challenging to determine who should take on this responsibility.
The interview participant noted that in communities that have experienced histories
of disinvestment and inequality such as the Rockaways, there should not be an unfair
burden placed on the community for their own resilience. However, this is somewhat
contrasted by nonprofit organizers who feel they should be in charge of their own
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resilience. One community organizer asserted that their organization “has done more
urban planning work in the Rockaway Peninsula than the city, state, and federal
government have in the past 10 years.” The same participant suggested that there needs to
be more nonprofit organizations on the ground providing direct aid and getting services
and programs allocated to their communities, considering that, “they’re the ones that know
the [community] needs the most.”
As we already know, community organizations were the first to step in and were
made responsible for their own resilience immediately after Sandy, placing the burden of
recovery directly on these groups. The director of a Community Development Corporation
(CDC) located on the eastern end recounted the organization's response in the months and
years following Sandy. They spoke on some of their programs: a mobile van that picked up
seniors and the disabled meant to alleviate public transportation disparities; classes to
teach residents about healthy food and nutrition while living in a food desert; and hard
skills training for long-term employment. Although much of the SIRR report was written to
provide similar training programs, they never came to fruition, leaving community
organizations largely responsible for their own economic development. The CDC director
mentioned that their organization’s mission was never meant to be related to resilience
work, but they’ve had to learn how to adapt given the ongoing planning efforts in the area.
A lot of their more recent work has been geared towards forums and workshops where the
planning processes are broken down and made more digestible for residents.
Many government agency interventions are still desired by community
organizations. There is a demand from residents for elected officials on all strands of
government to advocate for better roads, better transportation, better sewage systems,
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and more available health infrastructure. Currently, there is only one hospital in Rockaway
and not many other additional health facilities such as pharmacies or emergency care.
There was one other hospital years ago, Peninsula Hospital, but it shut down in 2012 shortly
before Sandy. Speaking to the peninsula’s isolation, the lack of facilities is worsened given
that residents have the longest commute times in the city, reducing their accessibility to
other options of care. Lack of access to physical and mental health services has
perpetuated extensive disaster related trauma throughout the peninsula. Referring back to
the Resilient Edgemere Community plan, community members were disheartened to learn
that there were no proposals for the construction of additional health and wellness
facilities, or any other type of supportive social infrastructure. Unfortunately, resilience
planning strategies have omitted any consideration of trauma and mental health care.
Resilience planning strategies since Sandy have mostly taken the form of substantial
rebuilding initiatives or smaller programs. NYC Emergency Management (NYCEM) and the
Mayor’s Office of Resiliency (MOR) both have programs geared towards strengthening
community networks and their adaptive capacities. Unfortunately, despite the success of
these programs, there is often less funding available for such programs with infrequent
“odd pots” of funds made available. It seems that there is a growing consensus among city
agencies that community resilience needs to be supported through these programs,
however, until that shift becomes more apparent, the burden of recovery and its
subsequent traumas will continue to fall onto community residents.
Burnout & Disaster Preparedness
I think many of the residents who took part in [COVID recovery] were
inspired in some ways by what happened during Sandy. And I think increased
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interest in resilience is from Sandy. But there’s also a lot of exhaustion from
residents who don’t want to talk anymore, and don’t want to take part...and
this is something we found particularly over the last two years.
-(Interview Participant 5, 2021)
The process of responding to, recovering from, and preparing for disasters is an
undeniably exhausting experience for those involved. To compound this with historic
issues of distrust and trauma creates a condition in which it is difficult to continue to
operate within the resiliency cycle. However, living in an era of increasing disaster risk and
susceptibility, communities have found themselves on edge—constantly planning and
preparing for the next disaster. This process has not been without loss of inertia, otherwise
referred to as burnout. Community organizers are constantly involved in the work, blurring
the lines between work and their everyday lives and risk creeps into their everyday
experiences: “there's a lot of burnout, you know, people are really tired, and they're burned
out. And, you know, we're doing this plan...the coastal plan? Or actually, I guess...I'm
blanking out...we're doing so many different things regarding planning.”
Unfortunately, not all those who got into resilience work after Sandy are still
practicing today given the immense burnout that comes along with the work. Meaningful
networks and mutual aid groups have dissolved because of burnout as well as lack of
funding to support the efforts. Speaking with a government agency representative whose
career has focused on community resilience, they explained their own experiences with
burnout:
I’ve had so many different lives of burnout and different recovery efforts.
Some people burn out, they don't come back and there’s a lot of knowledge
that’s lost. The shame for me is that some of the strongest, best
representatives of their communities, they didn’t make it to the next phase
-(Interview Participant 8, 2021)
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Nearly a decade has passed since Hurricane Sandy and there have been unfortunate
losses of networks along the way, many of which have not continued their work with
respect to COVID-19. At a time where these networks were most crucial, there have been
major cuts to funding across city, state, and federal levels. Organizations in Rockaway had
to make cuts to their staff and scale back their work as a result of budgetary constraints.
This was not unique to Rockaway or the city, however, and was seen across all levels of
government during the pandemic. The city’s summer youth employment program was cut
in Spring of 2020 and eventually reinstated, however there were a number of issues and
complications with the program this year, reducing the number of jobs from teenagers
across the city. COVID has shut down nonprofits and local businesses in the area, many of
which most likely will not come back. This puts additional stress on the organizations that
are standing because the few that are available (considering that Rockaway already has a
small number of community organizations to begin with) are now being put in a position
where they are asked to do work that might not be in their wheelhouse. Some of these
organizations are able to adapt their mission and their funding to be able to respond to the
pandemic, but many could not. Furthermore, many people did not have the technical ability
to switch over to working from home and many had to let go of their staff.
Organizations that have been able to adapt and continue to support resilience
efforts in the Rockaways are still operating and serving the community during the
pandemic. Their prior disaster recovery experience has made them more aware of what
steps need to be taken. One Rockaway community group transformed a vacant lot into a
“Wellness Way” where they have been able to run COVID-19 testing on the site. Eventually,
they hope to distribute vaccinations at this site if possible. In the meantime, this lot exists
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as a hub for community recovery efforts. The group was also able to distribute produce
throughout the fall, summer, and spring to residents. Another organization spoke about
their outreach programs and wraparound services educating the community, specifically
senior populations on the eastern end, on the symptoms of COVID-19 and relevant
resources to contact. In partnership with the city, nurses would be on call to provide these
assessments. The organization also worked with local health clinics and the hospital to help
alleviate food insecurity, issues of transportation, medication access, and childcare.
Long-standing issues of transportation, isolation, socioeconomic, and racial
tensions continued to pose challenges for ongoing recovery work. The long commute times
for residents and the continued lack of healthcare infrastructure means that residents need
to travel by subway or bus for a minimum of 50 minutes to get adequate COVID-19 care. A
community member recounted a story about vaccinations on the peninsula, noting that
there were no vaccine appointment availabilities. However, the city was promoting
vaccinations at the Armory in Upper Manhattan not considering the 2-hour bus or subway
ride required to get there. This 2-hour bus ride is not only inconvenient, but increases the
risk of contracting COVID-19 for Rockaway residents. Another community member
recounted an instance of a friend of theirs who was able to get vaccinated at one of the
Rockaway sites who mentioned that the vaccination site was not listed on the city’s
vaccination finder website. City agency officials have stated that they want to prioritize
vulnerable populations, however, some claim that this is “lip service” once more, similarly
to earlier resilience plans. Additionally, given past issues of distrust, residents feel that it is
not enough to open a vaccination site in Rockaway but there also needs to be additional
outreach, led by local organizations. These communities tend to trust their local
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community organizations more than city officials. Although issues with vaccines and
testing are not unique to the peninsula as they’ve been seen throughout the city, in a
community that already has no trust towards city government, these complications have
consequences.
From one disaster to the next with Sandy and COVID-19, people are tired and their
anger has grown stronger during the pandemic. Mostly, this is because they already had
anger after Sandy because of their perceived issues with recovery. Some of this anger is
productive, whereas some of it leads to burnout and continues to exhaust and retraumatize
communities. The cycle of distrust, trauma, and burnout is ingrained in the respond,
recover, and prepare resilience framework that is employed by urban planners time and
time again. Unfortunately, community residents and organizers are unable to operate
within this framework and instead experience these phenomena endlessly, constantly
combatting everyday hazards and risks as a result of disasters.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions of this research attribute issues of distrust, trauma, and burnout in
the Rockaway peninsula to the implementation and execution of resilience planning
strategies after Hurricane Sandy. Moreover, these causalities have been exacerbated by the
phased approach of resilience planning by urban planners as a respond-recover-prepare
phenomenon which operates in stark contrast to community-level experiences of
resilience. Evidence presented in this thesis asserts that resilience planning strategies have
negatively determined COVID-19 response and recovery in Rockaway thus far. Not only has
recovery been negatively impacted, but these impacts are felt in differing degrees
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throughout the peninsula spatially, continuing to prolong and contribute to issues of
historical fragmentations in Rockaway. The evidence presented in this thesis also suggests
how future COVID-19 recovery will unfold on the peninsula unless there are major shifts to
resilience thinking at the city, state, and federal levels. Ongoing issues of resilience
planning in the field of urban planning一and as they exist in Rockaway一along with the
evidence presented in this thesis, illustrate the need for additional research and discussion
on the topics at hand.
Further Planning Considerations
Planners practice resilience through phases, organizing only after a disaster to plan
and then rebuild, potentially ignoring the time before the disaster despite its potential for
ensuring long-term community resilience and preparedness. The resilience cycle that this
thesis refers to describes a framework that urban planners use to think about the timing
and phasing of planning activities as opposed to a cycle that is lived on the ground and
within a community context. On the ground, the conditions of response, recovery, and
preparedness are lived simultaneously as opposed to through phases. Challenging this
planning framework is instrumental in reframing resilience to reduce distrust, trauma, and
burnout. Resilience planning requires a paradigm shift as the way planners currently view
resilience is retroactive, emphasizes large-scale projects and design, while simultaneously
rejecting smaller interventions at the community level that are just as (if not, more)
effective in preparing communities for disaster.
Initial disaster response efforts aim to ensure that lives are saved, shelter is
provided, food is secured, and livelihoods are restored, which with respect to Rockaway,
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was mostly done through community-led efforts after Hurricane Sandy. Afterwards, as the
disaster cycle begins transitioning into recovery, planning efforts focus mostly on issues of
the built environment. This results in the de-emphasis of the human recovery that is
required after a disaster and neglects to alleviate the shocks, traumas, and healing that are
necessary to establish adaptive capacity for individuals and their respective communities.
When this de-emphasis of the human condition occurs, the next crisis一the next shock to
the urban system一becomes an even greater shock to the system than the previous
disaster. If recovery and preparedness are simultaneous (which this study claims them to
be), this human recovery is a vital and necessary component of resiliency. The continuous
practice of resilience and recontextualization of everyday risk can help reduce community
distrust, trauma, and burnout from the planning process. There is an opportunity now to
analyze the time in between disasters and redevelop the way resilience planning is
operationalized, practiced, and theorized in the field of urban planning. Although outside
the scope of this thesis, questions remain relating to how planners can acknowledge these
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APPENDIX
Semi-structured Interview Questions
Questions for City Agency Representatives
1. What is your current role at your organization?
2. How do you define the term “resilience” and how is resilience built, in your opinion?
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3. How were you involved in post-Hurricane Sandy efforts as they related to strengthening
resiliency?
4. How were you involved in post-COVID-19 planning efforts? (questions 3 and 4 may not
both be applicable to the interviewee)
5. Do you believe that these resilience efforts that emerged after Hurricane Sandy better
prepared communities to manage COVID-19?
a. If so, why? What efforts specifically? If not, what do you think was missing?
6. Did your organization learn anything from local community organizations and how they
were able to combat these crises? If so, is this seen in your organizations planning efforts?
7. What were major hurdles faced by your organization when devising and implementing
resilience planning strategies?
Questions for Community Organization Professionals
1. What is your current role at your organization?
2. What is your organization’s mission/purpose?
3. How do you define the term “resilience” and how is resilience built, in your opinion?
4. How were you involved in post-Hurricane Sandy efforts as they related to strengthening
resiliency?
5. How was your organization involved in the COVID-19 response? Did you see aspects of
resilience planning being implemented (questions 4 and 5 may not both be applicable to
the interviewee)?
6. What were the major hurdles faced at the community level during these crises? How did
your community approach these hurdles?
7. How did you, and your community, perceive the City’s response to these crises?
8. Do you believe that these resilience efforts that emerged after Hurricane Sandy helped
to prepare your community for COVID-19?
a. a. If so, why? What efforts specifically? If not, what do you think was missing?
58
